Abstract: This research discusses the Internet service provider (ISP) bandwidth allocation and pricing problems for a duopoly bandwidth market with two competitive ISPs. According to the contracts between Internet subscribers and ISPs, Internet subscribers can enjoy their services up to their contracted bandwidth limits. However, in reality, many subscribers may experience the facts that their on-line requests are denied or their connection speeds are far below their contracted speed limits. One of the reasons is that ISPs accept too many subscribers as their subscribers. To avoid this problem, ISPs can set limits for their subscribers to enhance their service qualities. This paper develops constrained nonlinear programming to deal with this problem for two competitive ISPs. The condition for reaching the equilibrium between the two competitive firms is derived. The market equilibrium price and bandwidth resource allocations are derived as closed form solutions.
INTRODUCTION
Two of the most popular technologies that offer speedy access to surf the Internet are the DSL (Digital Subscriber Line) broadband and the cable Modem. DSL P.S. You, C.C. Lee, Y.C. Hsieh/ Bandwidth allocation and pricing problem 66 service provides Internet access over a single dedicated telephone line, while Cable broadband service provides Internet access over a cable television line.
The advantages of DSL incorporate cheaper service than cable Internet, no dial up, no busy signals and a unique connection. Several different types of DSL exist. ADSL is one of the most popular broadband media among them, for both commercial and residential internet users. ADSL is a mod/demod technology providing high-speed web service through a traditional telephone line. ADSL can also be used to provide home office workers with company Internet services or new style interactive multimedia applications, including web games and VOID services.
Regarding the Cable Modem, it uses the high bandwidth cable system laid by the cable TV service provider to enable users to watch TV programs, use telephone services and surf the Internet simultaneously. The greatest advantage of Cable Modem is a huge bandwidth with its technological specifications, making the data transmission speed ascend promptly, and consequently, the dream of transferring more data on a given bandwidth is realized. In addition, Cable offers a much wider service area than DSL.
The bandwidth requirements are distinctive according to the needs of the Internet users. Operating in such an environment, DSL and Cable providers usually offer a variety of bandwidth commodities to serve their customers, with each Internet commodity having a different sales price and a unique bandwidth restriction.
To offer different Internet commodities to customers, both DSL and Cable providers face the problems of allocating a bandwidth resource to distinct Internet commodities. According to the subscription contracts, Internet users are allowed to access Internet service within the contracted speed. However, in reality, they are usually in a situation that their on-line requests are denied, or their connection speeds are far below their contracted speed limits. The quality of the Internet services may be influenced by the number of on-line users. It is natural to assume that the quality of the Internet services will become poorer if too many users access the Internet at the same time. To improve their corporation images, both DSL and Cable providers have to provide their Internet subscribers with the agreed service qualities. One of the possible approaches for overcoming this problem is to control the number of subscribers. To reach this goal, both DSL and Cable providers can use the pricing strategies to control the number of subscribers.
It is possible to surf the Internet by either DSL or Cable Modem. For competition purposes, DSL and Cable providers may offer similar Internet commodities to complete the same custom pool. According to this and the previously mentioned fact, both DSL and Cable providers may seriously consider their pricing strategies to complete in the Internet market. This paper considers a duopolistic market which consists of a DSL provider and a Cable provider. The two Internet service providers offer two similar Internet commodities.
To our knowledge, few works deal with the ISP competition problem with service quality guarantees. Other research related to this article includes the works on the equilibrium price in duopoly market. Palma and Leruth (1993) dealt with a duopoly model for two firms which sell homogeneous goods. They showed the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium price. Harrington (1995) investigated the price-setting behavior in a duopoly market where the degree of product differentiation is uncertain. They showed that in markets with highly substitutable products, price dispersion can be enhanced, since price adjustment is used to obtain more information about the context of product differentiation. Choi (1996) dealt with a price competition problem with duopoly manufacturers and duopoly common retailers. This paper proves that product differentiation is helpful to manufacturers, while store differentiation is helpful to retailers. Peha and Tewari (1998) examined the result of competition between two profitseeking telecommunications carriers. In their work, each firm has a limited capacity that can be used to offer two different services. They showed conditions for an equilibrium where no carrier has any incentive to change its prices and outputs. Elberfeld and Wolfstetter (1999) investigated a repeated game with simultaneous entry and pricing. They provided a symmetric equilibrium solution. Mason (2000) dealt with an Internet pricing problem. This paper showed that conditions for reaching equilibrium for two competitive firms exist. Foros and Hansen (2001) dealt with a competition problem between two ISPs providing the quality of interconnection. Min et al. (2002) dealt with a pricing setting problem for two competitive firms that produce substitutable products. They derived equilibrium solutions based on a two-stage game framework. Basar and Srikant (2002) investigated a leader-follower game problem for a network with a single ISP and a larger number of users. In this problem, the service provider sets the sales price and the customers react to the price, as well as to the network congestion. Bapna et al. (2005) investigated a pricing setting problem for digital products. This study contains a service provider that uses a price setting mechanism to maximize its allocation efficiency. Symeonidis (2003) compared Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. This paper provides a condition that quantity competition is more beneficial than price competition for both consumers and firms. Dai et al. (2005) developed pricing strategies for a revenue management problem with multiple firms providing the same service for a common pool of customers. They showed that Nash equilibrium exists in a two-firm pricing game when the demands of both firms are deterministic.
The strategy in duopoly environment has been widely studied in many industries. The constraints on most of the studies include the budget constraint, quantity constraint, etc. As mentioned previously, ISPs need to take their service quality into account. If ISPs are unable or have no plan to expand their equipment over a future time interval, endlessly accepting customers as their subscribers, they will run the risk of poor Internet access quality. To avoid such a situation, both DSL and Cable providers should seriously set their pricing strategies, in order to improve their service qualities.
This research discusses the bandwidth allocation and pricing problems by taking the service qualities into account. The model hypothesizes that there is only a DSL service provider and a Cable service provider in the market; the two service providers offer two similar Internet service commodities, and both of the rivaling parties confront limited total bandwidth and service level. By establishing a mathematical model and Lagrange function, reaction functions of the two service providers can be obtained. Through the derived reaction functions and some condition, this paper obtains closed form formulas for the market equilibrium prices and bandwidth resource allocations for the two competitive ISPs.
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS, DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION
This section of the paper will develop a mathematical model for the problem. We assume that a DSL Internet service provider and a Cable Internet service provider 
of provider m is assumed to follow the function of
where the symbol i h represents the substitution coefficient of similar commodities offered by different service providers and is assumed to be 1 ≤ of subscribers of commodity i of a service provider m that makes online requests. In order to keep the ISP's service quality, we assume that ISP m will let the probability, i.e., the ratio of the number of bandwidth units allocated for commodity i exceeds the number of bandwidth resource needed by subscribers of commodity i, be no less than the prescribed service level 1
This paper aims to set the equilibrium commodity price p m,i and determine the bandwidth allocation decisions b m,i . We have illustrated the model descriptions and assumptions. We will now formulate the model. Firstly, we summarize our notation and decision variables as follows. where inequality (8) is a rewritten form of inequality (6).
ANALYSIS
For the purpose of shortening our formulation, we will denote the following functions. 
Afterwards, we can rewrite revenue function m R as follows.
In addition, using (1) and (10), we can rewrite inequality (8) as follows. Table 2 where i m Z , is determined by using the Excel function NORMSINV as The following will provide some insight into the impact of different input characteristics on the equilibrium sales prices and bandwidth allocations. We refer to the data set used in the above example as the basic parameter set. We investigate the impact In the following cases, only one parameter changes, while others remain unchanged. The computational results are described in Table 3 to Table 8 . h . This phenomenon could be explained as follows. Note from the demand function in (01) that the demand for commodity 1 of service provider 1 = m increases in the value of 1 h when the sales price of 11 p is lower than its rival's sales price 21 p . In this environment, as the value of 1 h increases, the impact of the difference between 21 p and 11 p on demand becomes extensive. In case of increasing demand, service provider m = 1 may decrease its sales price to spur more market demand. On the other hand, the rival may decrease its sales price to keep its market share. Thus, the values of 11 p and 21 p decrease in the value of 1 h . In addition, since both service providers may try to sell more, they provide more bandwidth units for commodity 1. Thus, the values of 11 p and 21 p increase in the value of 1 h . p to avoid the decrease in demand. Thus, service provider m = 1 decreases the value of 11 p , and increases the value of 12 p as 1
β increases. β . The explanation of this Table is similar to that of Table 5 . Table 7 shows that the value of 11 b increases in the value of 11
α . This phenomenon could be explained as follows. It is noted that the bandwidth required increases as the service level increases. Thus, service provider m = 1 increases the bandwidth allocation to commodity 1 when it expects to have a higher service level. α . The explanation of this Table is similar to that of Table 7 . 
CONCLUSIONS
This research discussed the problem of bandwidth allocation and pricing in an Internet duopoly market. The bandwidth commodities' service level was taken into consideration. In order to find a solution to the problem, this research developed a Lagrange function to develop the optimal sales price and bandwidth allocation for both Internet service providers. The results were used to establish the reaction functions. Under certain conditions, this paper proposed closed form formulas for the market equilibrium price and bandwidth resource allocation.
A numerical analysis is also provided to illustrate the impact of different input parameters on the equilibrium sales prices and bandwidth allocations. The results are summarized as follows:
1. For both service providers, the equilibrium sales price of a commodity decreases, and the bandwidth allocation of a commodity increases in the degree of substitutability between commodities of the two service providers (Tables 3 and 4 ). 2. The equilibrium sales price of commodity-1 of service provider-1 and the bandwidth allocation of commodity-1 of service provider-2 decrease, and the equilibrium sales price of commodity-2 of service provider-1 and the bandwidth allocation of commodity-2 of service provider-2 increase in the degree of substitutability between the commodities offered by service provider-1 (Table 5 ). 3. The equilibrium sales price of commodity-1 of service provider-2 and the bandwidth allocation of commodity-1 of service provider-1 decrease, and the equilibrium sales price of commodity-2 of service provider-2 and the bandwidth allocation of commodity-2 of service provider-1 increase in the degree of substitutability between the commodities offered by service provider-2 (Table 6 ). 4. The bandwidth allocation of a commodity-i for a service provider increases in the intercept of demand function for that commodity for that service provider- (Tables 7 and 8 
